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We test the hypothesis that the 2003 dividend tax cut boosted U.S. stock prices and thus 
lowered the cost of equity.  Using an event-study methodology, we attempt to identify an 
aggregate stock market effect by comparing the behavior of U.S. common stock prices to 
that of European stocks and real estate investment trusts.  We also examine the relative 
cross-sectional response of prices on high-dividend versus low-dividend paying stocks.  
We do not find any imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the aggregate 
U.S. stock market.  On the other hand, high-dividend stocks outperformed low-dividend 
stocks by a few percentage points over the event windows, suggesting that the tax cut did 
induce asset reallocation within equity portfolios.  Finally, the positive abnormal returns 
on non-dividend paying U.S. stocks in 2003 do not appear to be tied to tax-cut news.  
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I.  Introduction 
On May 28
th of 2003 the President signed into law The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 which, among other provisions, reduced the maximum tax 
rate on dividends from 38 to 15 percent.  A related provision in the bill lowered the top 
rate on long-term capital gains from 20 percent to 15 percent, thereby equalizing those 
two tax rates for the first time since 1990.  The dividend tax cut was perhaps the most 
dramatic provision in the bill and was almost certainly the most contentious.  Indeed, the 
bill passed the Senate on a vote of 51-50, following weeks of wrangling, and up until the 
last day it remained unclear whether the bill would contain anything close to the 
significant cut in dividend taxes that was ultimately enacted.   
  During the debate leading up to enactment, proponents ascribed many benefits to 
the dividend tax cut.  One of the main arguments was that reducing taxes on investment 
income would lower the cost of capital to business, stimulating investment and job 
creation.
1  Lower dividend taxes would also be reflected in higher U.S. corporate equity 
prices, which, as a side benefit, would boost spending through the wealth effect.
2  For 
instance, a Treasury official testified before Congress that, although the Treasury had not 
worked up its own estimate, “estimates [by others] of the impact on stock market 
valuations range from 5 percent to 15 percent (Fisher (2003)).”  By capitalizing the CBO 
projection of the annual flow of foregone dividend taxes, Poterba (2004) estimated that 
the dividend tax cut could have boosted the value of U.S. equities by roughly 6 percent.  
The likely valuation effects remain a relevant concern going forward, when Congress 
faces the decision of whether to allow the tax cuts to expire in 2010, as provided for in 
current law. 
                                                 
1 Whether and how dividend taxation affects corporate investment decisions remains an area of active 
empirical and theoretical debate, usually referred to as the “new” and “traditonal” views on dividend 
taxation.  Auerbach and Hassett (2002) provide an extensive overview of this important topic, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
2 The other widely-cited benefit advanced by proponents of the bill was that the reduction in the dividend 
tax rate would encourage more companies to pay dividends, facilitating both the redistribution of capital 
resources and corporate governance reform.  While Chetty and Saez (2005) document a substantial boost to 
dividends from the tax cut, Brown, et al. (2004) find that the tax cut had a more muted effect on total 
payouts because many firms offset the increase in dividends with less share repurchases.   3
  In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the cut in capital taxation boosted U.S. 
stock prices.
3  We use an event-study methodology focused on time periods with notable 
positive news about the potential for passage of a dividend tax cut.  We attempt to 
identify an aggregate market effect by comparing the behavior of U.S. common stock 
prices to the prices of securities that received no direct benefit from the tax cut.  Our 
primary test involves comparing stock returns in the U.S. to returns on European stock 
markets, where U.S. investors – the beneficiaries of the tax law change – hold only a 
small fraction of shares outstanding (and presumably do not make up the “marginal 
investor”).  We also compare the performance of U.S. stocks to the returns of real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), which received no benefit from the tax cut as they were 
already tax-advantaged. 
  In addition, we analyze the cross-sectional impact of the dividend tax cut news, 
by examining the relative response of stock prices across firms with different dividend 
policies.  Such analysis allows us to address the tax effect at a disaggregated level and 
provides a robustness check on the validity of our event window choices.  Given the 
uncertainty that always surrounds future tax policy, compounded in this case by sunset 
provisions and projections of large budget deficits, investors may well have discounted 
more heavily the tax savings on far-future dividends.  If so, stocks with high current 
dividend yields would have been affected more than “growth” stocks paying little or no 
dividends.  Finally, to bring some further counter-factual evidence to bear, we examine 
the cross-sectional behavior of yields on U.S. corporate bonds and the cross-sectional 
behavior of U.K. stock prices during the event windows.  
  In sum, we fail to find much, if any, imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the 
value of the aggregate stock market.  U.S. large-cap and small-cap indexes do not 
outperform either their European counterparts or REITs over the event windows.  Despite 
                                                 
3 In this regard, our paper fits within an extensive literature on capitalization of taxes in asset prices, 
reviewed in Auerbach (2002) and Poterba (2002).  Empirical verification of tax capitalization has 
proceeded across three distinct paths: tests of Brennan’s (1970) after-tax version of the CAPM, studies of 
ex-dividend date returns, and analyses linking tax rates and asset valuations.  Recent work, such as that by 
Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003), Chetty, Rosenberg, and Saez (2005), and Sialm (2005a), to name 
just a few, has been concentrated in the last two strands.   4
the claims of the tax-cut proponents, this result may not be too surprising.  As suggested 
above, investors’ might have capitalized only a small part of the future tax benefits, due 
to the explicitly temporary nature of the tax break.  In addition, given the preponderance 
of tax-free investors, and institutional investors that book dividends as ordinary income, 
the “marginal investor” might have benefited relatively little from the tax cut. 
  The absence of a measurable aggregate effect, however, should not necessarily be 
taken as evidence of “tax irrelevance.”  In fact, our cross-sectional analysis indicates that 
high-dividend yield stocks did experience positive abnormal returns over the event 
windows, while low-dividend stocks moved in the opposite direction.  These 
countervailing stock movements are consistent with the possibility of portfolio 
rebalancing by alert taxable investors and would attenuate the aggregate effect of the tax 
cut.  Our interpretation of the positive abnormal returns on high-dividend stocks (in 
concert with no aggregate effect) is further bolstered by the lack of a similar pattern of 
abnormal returns within the cross-section of U.K. equities, which did not benefit from the 
tax law change. 
On the other hand, we find that non-dividend paying stocks, in contrast to low-
dividend yield stocks, outperformed the market (but not high-dividend yield stocks) on a 
risk-adjusted basis during the event periods.  At first glance, this finding is surprising 
because the tax gains on these shares accrue in the more distant future.  However, further 
careful inspection suggests that the timing of their abnormal returns is not tied to the 
event window.  Moreover, our analysis of these firms’ stock buybacks, on the one hand, 
and the returns on non-dividend-paying foreign stocks, on the other, both suggest that the 
zero-dividend stocks’ performance was unrelated to tax cut news. 
  On a purely statistical level, our cross-sectional findings are consistent with the 
empirical results in Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2004) and Auerbach and Hassett 
(2005, 2006) who also conduct event studies around the dividend tax.  Those studies use 
the cross-sectional variation in stock returns to test their hypotheses.  Brown, Liang, and 
Weisbenner (2004) test for the role of executive share ownership on the level and   5
composition of total payouts, while Auerbach and Hassett use the stock market response 
to the tax cut to evaluate the “new” versus the “traditional” view of dividend taxation.  
Neither analysis addresses the overall effect of the dividend tax cut on the U.S. stock 
market.  Indeed, some of their inferences seem to require the assumption of a positive 
aggregate effect.  Our results do undermine the Auerbach and Hassett (2005, 2006) 
interpretation of positive excess returns on zero-dividend stocks as a consequence of the 
dividend tax cut. 
  Dhaliwal, Krull and Li (2005) estimate the aggregate valuation effect induced by 
the tax act.  They back out two ex ante estimates of the required return on equity using 
the level of stock prices and analysts earnings forecasts at two different dates.  In 
principle, this approach controls for news about future cash flows, but it requires strong 
modeling choices and heroic assumptions about stability of the risk premium.  Thus, their 
finding that the aggregate cost of capital declined seems largely attributable to their 
choice of event window – March 31
st to June 30
th.  That window begins in the wake of an 
apparent peak in the market risk premium induced by uncertainty and anxiety regarding 
the probable invasion of Iraq.  To the extent that changes in equity risk premiums are 
global, this highlights the benefit of using European stocks (and REIT shares) as controls. 
 
II.  Event Windows 
News that a substantial dividend tax cut was being considered by the 
Administration as part of a major 2003 tax package first appeared in December of 2002, 
beginning with a piece in the December 4
th Wall Street Journal (McKinnon, 2002).  The 
press reports in December contained few details and largely couched the issue as a 
subject of debate within the administration.  The administration’s intention to propose a 
dividend tax cut only became clear in a January 3
rd Washington Post article (Allen and 
Milbank (2003)), which also laid out some of the elements of the tax package in advance 
of the President’s January 7
th speech to the Economics Club of Chicago.     6
  The vertical bars in Figure 1 plot the daily number of news stories in the 15 
largest U.S. newspapers that discussed both “dividends” and “taxes”.  As shown, 
newspaper coverage on this issue skyrocketed in the first week of January, peaking on 
January 8
th, the day after the speech.   The number of such stories quickly subsided 
during February through April as legislation made scant progress and the public focused 
on the prospect of war in Iraq.   We therefore assume that the first major event window 
occurs between January 3-9 (shaded in figure 1), the period over which newspaper 
coverage initially spiked.
4 
The dividend tax cut became a prime news story again in early May, following 
reports that House Republican leaders had finally agreed on a specific tax package 
containing a provision to lower the top tax rate on corporate dividends to 15 percent.  
Still, prior to mid-May it remained unclear whether any substantial cut in dividend taxes 
could pass the Senate.  For instance, a May 5
th Wall Street Journal article (Murray and 
McKinnon (2003)) led off with: “The Senate Finance Committee’s tax package probably 
won’t include any of the dividend-tax relief that President Bush wants, although it will 
leave room for a smaller version of the benefit if Republicans can muster support for it.”  
On May 9
th, it was reported that the Senate Finance Committee had agreed to include as 
part of the Senate tax package a much scaled-back benefit.  That tax package – which 
included only miniscule dividend tax relief compared to the original proposal – was 
expected to see “rougher waters” on the Senate floor (Murray (2003)). 
However, a breakthrough was reported on May 15
th (Firestone (2003)), 
specifically that the previous day “a bipartisan group of senators reached agreement with 
Republican leaders… adding a crucial Democratic vote to President Bush’s plan for 
eliminating taxes on dividends.”  Indeed, on May 15
th, three Democrats joined 48 
Republicans to pass a package under which investors could exclude 50 percent of 
                                                 
4 This window coincides with the second of eight event windows assumed by Auerbach and Hassett (2005).  
It seems to us more plausible that there was too little meaningful information made available during their 
first, December 23-30, window.  Moreover, one could argue that, prior to the period surrounding the 
January 7 speech, the small boost to the probability of a dividend tax cut eventually occurring was just as 
likely to have occurred in the first couple weeks of December as in the last.  In any case, our analysis will 
provide some sense of the robustness of the conclusions to ruling out a December window.   7
dividend income from taxes this year and 100 percent of such income in 2004-2006, after 
which point the tax would be reinstated in full.   
Consequently, our second event period begins with May 14
th, the day of the first 
major breakthrough in Senate negotiations.  The last obstacle was breached with Senate 
passage of the compromise legislation early in the morning on May 23
rd, but we let the 
formal event window run through May 28
th, two business days later, when the President 
signed the bill.
5  
As shown in the chart, stock market gains during the two tax-cut event windows 
are relatively modest.  Over the January 3-9 window, the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 
small-cap index rose about 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively.  Over the May 14-28 
window, the S&P 500 rose 1.2 percent, while the small-cap index rose 2.7 percent.  
(Including May 6-13 would boost the second-window returns to 2.9 and 5 percent, 
respectively.)   These moves appear to be swamped by the slump and rebound of share 
prices around the threat and then realization of war in Iraq.  In particular, on March 17
th, 
news that the U.S, Britain and Spain announced an end to their efforts to win UN support 
for a war, and of an impending televised address by Bush, sent the S&P 500 soaring 3-½ 
percent that day alone (McKay (2003)).  Investors were apparently relieved by the 
resolution of the uncertainty about if and when the war would commence.   
III.  Aggregate Market Evidence 
Although our empirical analysis of the effects of the 2003 dividend tax cut on the 
stock market takes on several guises, the methodology is similar in all cases.  In this 
section, we present three tests contrasting the change in value of a portfolio of U.S. 
common stocks that currently (or prospectively) generate taxable dividend streams with 
the change in value of a benchmark portfolio of securities during the two event windows.   
                                                 
5 This window roughly coincides with windows 7 + 8 from Auerbach and Hassett (2005).  One could 
reasonably justify a different starting point for our second event period.  In particular, one could argue for 
May 6, the day the House Ways and Means Committee approved a $550 billion tax package including a 
substantial cut in dividend tax rates.  On the other hand, we could have chosen May 23
 as the starting point, 
following Brown, et al. (2005).  In either case our qualitative results would stand; however, using the 
longer period reduces the power of our tests by widening the confidence bands.   8
In each case, the tax cut legislation under consideration can be reasonably presumed to 
have little or no direct effect on the valuation of the benchmark portfolio.  Thus, by 
examining the relative returns on U.S. common stocks, we can in principle control for the 
effects of general economic news and investor sentiment. 
Our first two tests compare U.S. stock market returns with returns on foreign 
equities.  The benefits of the dividend tax cut would accrue only to investors subject to 
the U.S. tax law, and U.S. investors hold a relatively small fraction of foreign equities – 
between 10 and 15 percent of most European markets (Department of the Treasury and 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2005)).  In addition, the benefit of the tax cut to a 
U.S. owner of foreign stocks is typically less than the benefit they would receive on U.S. 
company dividends because the U.S. taxpayer’s total tax liability on a foreign stock 
equals the maximum of the U.S. and foreign country dividend tax rates (Rousslang 
(1999)).   
Figures 2 and 3 present our tests for excess positive returns on the U.S. stock 
market relative to foreign counterparts.  The top panels of Figure 2 show the levels of two 
broad large-cap stock market indexes – the S&P 500 and S&P Euro 350 (IShares) – 
surrounding the key time periods.  The latter index tracks large firms domiciled in 
continental Europe, covering about 70 percent of the region’s market capitalization and 
spanning 17 exchanges.
6   Over both event windows, shown by the two shaded areas, the 
performance of European stocks appears similar to or better than that of U.S. stocks.  
Although the visual evidence in the top panel is suggestive, this comparison does 
not control for the “normal” relationship between U.S. and foreign equities.  To do so, we 
assume that the U.S. and foreign stock indexes are influenced by a common (global) 
market factor, but with different loadings, or sensitivities.  We then regress daily S&P 
500 returns on daily S&P Euro 350 returns in the six months before and after the event 
                                                 
6 An important characteristic of the S&P 350 Euro index is that it is available to the U.S. investors in the 
form of an exchange-traded fund, which eliminates non-synchronicity problems associated with foreign 
securities traded abroad.  Since the value of the exchange-traded fund is held close to the Index by 
arbitrage, it does not matter that the exchange-traded fund is largely owned by US investors.    9
period (July-Dec. 2002 and July-Dec. 2003) to obtain an estimate of the relative beta for 
the S&P 500 during normal times.
7 
  We find a strong positive link between returns in the two markets (β = 0.66), with 
fluctuations in foreign equity returns accounting for nearly two-thirds of variation in the 
S&P 500 returns.  Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between actual and 
model-predicted S&P 500 returns.  These abnormal returns are then cumulated over the 
relevant time horizon and plotted in the lower panel of Figure 2, normalized to 100 at the 
beginning of each event window (January 2 and May 13, 2003). 
If the U.S. stock market responded to the possibility of a dividend tax cut, then its 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) would be positive during the event periods.  As 
shown by the thick black line in the lower left hand panel, the cumulative abnormal 
return from January 3-9 is estimated to be positive but small, about 2 percent.  On the 
other hand, abnormal S&P 500 returns over the May event window are negative, on net.  
Thus, during the key periods where the actual form of the tax cut took shape and was 
adopted, the S&P 500 did not outperform a comparably broad index of European 
equities.  The picture also indicates that including December in the event window would 
not help boost the estimated effect.   
At the same time, it is important to note that our test has fairly low statistical 
power.  Daily index returns were quite volatile in 2002 and 2003, with a standard 
deviation of 1.5 percentage points over our estimation period.  Even though much of this 
variance is explained by movements in the S&P Euro 350 index, the remaining variation 
is large enough to generate wide standard error bounds, which increase as the event 
horizon lengthens.
8  The error bounds, shown by the dotted lines, serve as an illustration 
of the magnitude of the stock market response necessary to overcome statistical doubts 
about the tax effect, a task that this exercise clearly fails.   
                                                 
7 We exclude January-June 2003, the period over which the proposal is announced and debated, because the 
correlation between returns the two markets’ returns was presumably distorted by events.  Estimated 
abnormal returns are similar when model estimation period is 2002, but error bands are somewhat wider. 
8 See Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, chapter 4.   10
As a robustness check, we re-estimate our results using weekly returns data, 
which smoothes out some day-to-day fluctuations in the market.  Although the variance 
of excess weekly returns is lower, their cumulative level (the thin solid line in the bottom 
panels) is about the same and still below zero over the May period, again indicating no 
measurable positive effect of the tax cut.
9 
Small-capitalization stocks, as reflected by the Russell 2000 index, outperformed 
large-cap stocks over 2003, particularly around May.  This observation seemed to 
contradict to the common wisdom that large-cap stocks, particularly companies paying 
high dividends now, stood the most to gain.  That view is consistent with a fairly simple 
valuation framework where future tax policy is uncertain, and thus the tax-liability 
benefit on distant-future dividends is heavily discounted.
10  
If small-cap U.S. stocks were positively affected by the tax cut, then one would 
expect small-cap stocks in the U.S. to have performed unusually well in comparison to 
foreign small-cap stocks.  We examine this hypothesis in Figure 3, where the FTSE Small 
Cap index is used as a foreign-market counterpart to the Russell 2000.
11  The co-
movement exhibited in the top panels suggests that the surge in small-cap stocks was a 
global phenomenon.  This is confirmed by the abnormal returns plotted in the lower 
panels of the exhibit at the daily (thick solid line) frequency.  The abnormal returns are 
zero over the January event window, and are even marginally negative over the May 
window, again contradicting the hypothesis that the tax cut was behind the strong market 
performance of small-cap U.S. stocks. 
As an alternative to using foreign markets as a control, we also consider a class of 
U.S. assets whose dividends were specifically excluded from the 2003 tax cut.  Real 
                                                 
9 We estimate the other excess returns models with the weekly data as well.  As the results remain 
qualitatively similar, we do not show the weekly excess returns separately.  
10 If there is uncertainty about the permanence of the dividend tax cut, stocks with lower dividend yields 
should experience a smaller price response (see Auerbach, 2002).  The dividend yield of the Russell 2000 is 
substantially lower than that of the S&P 500 firms.   
11 The FTSE Small Cap index tracks stocks trading on the London stock exchange, which creates a non-
synchronicity problem.  To address this issue, in estimating a model for abnormal returns, we regress 
Russell 2000 returns for calendar day t on FTSE Small Cap returns for calendar days t and t+1; we also 
estimate a weekly version (not shown for brevity).     11
estate investment trusts (REITs) do not pay taxes on their profits at the corporate level if 
they distribute at least 90% of taxable profits to their investors.  Although such 
distributions are commonly referred to as “dividends,” their tax-free pass-through to 
investors made them ineligible for the lower dividend tax rate.  Consequently, if the 
dividend tax cut boosted the valuation of (eligible) common stocks, one would expect 
REIT returns to have underperformed relative to the broad market over the event 
windows; that is, abnormal REIT returns should have been negative. 
As shown in the top panels of Figure 4, REIT share prices generally tracked the 
overall market for most of the event windows, even after the reconciled version of the tax 
legislation passed the Senate-House conference and the tax treatment of REIT 
distributions was made clear.  Only on the day before the bill was signed into law did 
REIT shares decline sharply, and then only temporarily.  The lower panels of Figure 4 
examine the cumulative abnormal REIT returns, estimated relative to S&P 500 returns.  
Abnormal returns are near zero during the event windows and well within the estimated 
error bounds and are modestly positive by the end of July.  Having found no effect of the 
dividend tax cut on aggregate U.S. stock valuations, in the next section we attempt to 
determine whether the legislation had any significant cross-sectional effects on U.S. stock 
valuations. 
IV.  Cross-sectional Evidence 
A. Abnormal returns by current dividend yield portfolio 
  In a world without uncertainty where all corporate net income is eventually paid 
out as dividends, a once-and-for-all cut in the dividend tax rate would have a similar 
positive valuation effect on all common stocks, regardless of their current dividend yield.  
Perhaps the most obvious complication is the uncertainty regarding future tax policy in 
light of the frequency of such changes over the century (see, for example, figures 3 and 4 
in Sialm (2005b)).  Indeed, the 2003 law and its early incarnations explicitly embedded 
sunset provisions – the reduced dividend tax rate was set to expire in 2008, absent   12
additional legislative action.
12  Together with growing budget deficits, the sunset 
provision undoubtedly added to the usual degree of uncertainty about the duration of the 
benefit. 
The uncertain permanence of a dividend tax cut should dampen the positive 
valuation effect on all stocks, but more so for stocks on which the lion’s share of 
dividends may not be paid until far into the future, i.e. stocks that currently pay little or 
no dividend.
 13  Accordingly, we look for cross-sectional effects of the proposed dividend 
tax cut by splitting our sample of roughly 2800 firms into four portfolios based on their 
dividend yield in 2002.  As shown in Table 1, just over half of the firms paid no 
dividends in 2002.  We split the dividend-paying firms into three portfolios, high-, 
medium-, and low-dividend firms. We define high-dividend firms as those for which the 
ratio of 2002 dividends to end-of-year price (“dividend yield”) is greater than 3 percent, 
about a fifth of the dividend-payers.  Medium-dividend firms have a dividend yield 
between 1 and 3 percent, while low-dividend firms are those with a dividend yield of less 
than 1 percent.  Summary statistics for each group are presented in Table 1.  The zero-
dividend firms are notably smaller, more investment intensive, and less debt reliant than 
the other groups. 
The top panels of Figure 5 show the cumulative realized returns for each group 
(equal-weighted) over the two event periods.  The cumulative returns ranged between 1 
and 2 percent during the January 2003 event window for each group.  During the May 
event period, the high-dividend and zero-dividend portfolios logged gains of 
approximately five percent, noticeably more than the other portfolios.
14  Because risk 
characteristics almost surely vary systematically across these groups, we test for 
differential performance by computing abnormal returns using the Fama-French three-
                                                 
12 On May 11, 2006, the Congress voted to extend the tax cut for two more years, to 2010.   
13 Low-dividend firms tend to be concentrated in growth industries, where firm survival and thus eventual 
payment of dividends is more uncertain.  Consequently, low-payout firms may be construed to have riskier 
dividend streams inducing risk-averse investors to discount some of the tax benefit and generating a 
second-order effect on the relationship between payout rates and response to a tax cut. 
14 Results are qualitatively similar for value weighting.   13
factor model estimated over a twelve-month period that straddles the event period (July-
Dec, 2002 and July-Dec. 2003).  Conclusions are insensitive to choice of the estimation 
period.  
As seen in the bottom panels of Figure 5, the high-dividend portfolio generated 
abnormal returns of around 1 percent in the January window and nearly 3 percent in the 
May window.  Interestingly, in the latter period, it appears that high-dividend stocks 
began to diverge from low- and medium-dividend stocks on May 14
th, a pattern that 
persisted until the day before the legislation was signed.  This supports our presumption 
that the May 14-28 period was an appropriate choice for the event window.  As shown 
formally in Table 2 (columns 3 and 4 of panels A and B), over each event window, the 
abnormal returns of the high-dividend firms are statistically different from zero and from 
the abnormal returns of low-dividend firms.   
To verify whether the positive CAR for high-dividend stocks over the event 
windows can be ascribed to the dividend tax cut, we carry out several robustness checks.  
First, we estimate abnormal bond returns for those high- and low-dividend firms that 
have bonds outstanding.  If the performance differential between high- and low-dividend 
stocks is related to systematic differences in economic news, rather than the tax cut, then 
we would also expect to see some differential in the bond returns for the two groups of 
firms.  As reported in Table 2 (panel C), we find no evidence of abnormal bond returns 
for either the high- or low-dividend group, consistent with the presumption that the gap in 
equity performance is driven by the tax event. 
In addition, we test for differences in abnormal returns across dividend-yield 
based portfolios in a cross- section of UK stocks using a simple market model.  The 
results shown in Figure 7 are in stark contrast to those for the U.S. stocks.  In particular, 
we find that abnormal returns for both high- and low-dividend UK stocks were 
essentially zero over event windows defined on the basis for the change in U.S. tax law.  
Importantly, this result also corroborates our earlier identifying assumption that the   14
dividend tax cut did not have any substantial implications for the valuation of European 
stocks. 
One way to reconcile the apparent tax responsiveness in the cross-section of stock 
returns with the absence of an aggregate tax effect is through the possibility of portfolio 
rebalancing by taxable investors.  Such investors could choose to rebalance their stock 
portfolios toward high-dividend stocks, while not changing their overall allocation 
between stocks and bonds.  Indeed, positive abnormal returns of a high-dividend stock 
portfolio in Figure 5 are counterbalanced by the low-dividend portfolio’s losses.  In fact, 
the stocks in our high-dividend-yield portfolio represented less than 15 percent of the 
total market value of the all stocks in the sample.  Thus, this subset of stocks could have 
been boosted at the expense of other, lower-dividend-paying stocks. 
The results also suggest that the performance differential was not persistent, 
having dissipated by July.  Though we cannot draw any statistically meaningful 
conclusions, a temporary response and reversal could be the result of temporary 
illiquidity: that is, the cross-sectional valuation effects of a quick response by alert tax-
sensitive investors might have been eventually arbitraged away by non-taxable investors 
making offsetting portfolio changes. 
B. Interpretation of abnormal returns on zero-dividend stocks 
Another notable feature of Figure 5 is the positive (1-1/2 percent) abnormal 
returns logged by zero-dividend firms in the May window, which are marginally 
statistically significant.  As mentioned earlier, this result seems to present a puzzle.  The 
positive CARs on stocks with a high current dividend yield are consistent with theoretical 
predictions of the effect of a temporary tax cut for dividend-paying firms.  Yet, the out-
performance of zero-dividend stocks relative to the overall market (and low-dividend 
stocks) casts some doubt on that interpretation.   
Auerbach and Hassett (2005) argue that such positive abnormal returns on zero-
dividend stocks constitute evidence that the tax cut lowered the cost of capital for an 
important set of firms.  In particular, they hypothesize a world in which share prices of   15
zero-dividend firms should be those most sensitive to the proposed tax cut.  Their main 
assumption is that zero-dividend firms tend to be immature firms that are more likely 
than others to issue a substantial amount of new shares in the future, due to their inability 
to satisfy large investment needs with internally-generated funds or by issuing interest-
bearing debt.  Current shareholders of such firms would reap the windfall on dividends to 
be paid on current shares as well as shares yet to be issued.  This would inflate the 
response of those firms current market value to a cut in dividend taxes.
15 
One way to test this explanation would be to identify those zero-dividend firms 
that are most likely to be truly equity-issuance dependent and then compare their 
abnormal returns to other zero-dividend firms for which this story is less plausible.  We 
consider one such experiment in Table 3 and Figure 6.  Here, the portfolio of zero 
dividend firms is split into three subgroups: firms that did not repurchase shares in the 
few years prior to 2003, firms that repurchased on average fewer than 2 percent of shares 
per annum, and firms that repurchased at least 2 percent of shares per annum.  Arguably, 
firms with large repurchases are not likely to be cash-flow constrained “immature” firms 
that expect to issue a lot of new shares in the near future.  Indeed, in the second row of 
table 3, we show the percent of firms in each group that subsequently issued a substantial 
amount (2 percent) of new shares between June 2003 and August 2005.  The zero-
dividend firms with large repurchases were notably less likely to subsequently issue new 
shares, even compared to firms that paid dividends.  
In any case, as can be seen in Figure 6, both inside and outside the event 
windows, we find virtually no difference between the abnormal returns of zero-dividend 
firms with large repurchases and those with zero repurchases.  These results would seem 
to cast doubt on the equity-dependence rationale for the positive abnormal event-window 
returns by zero-dividend firms.
16 
                                                 
15 Of course, the benefits of a temporary tax cut are still smaller than from a permanent cut since the tax 
break may expire before a firm decides to pay dividends. 
16 This discrete breakdown of zero-dividend firms is admittedly simple; however, the binary measure is 
transparent and allows for a simple statistical test of the difference in abnormal returns within the sample of 
zero-dividend firms.   16
Another possibility is that the abnormal returns on zero-dividend stocks are 
unrelated to the event.  In particular, Figure 6 shows that, unlike high-dividend firms, the 
abnormal performance of zero-dividend firms is not tied specifically to the event period, 
but rather runs almost continuously from mid-April through July.  This suggests that 
something else may be driving this result; for instance, the risk-factor model used to 
estimate normal returns for these firms could be substantially mis-specified.
17   
We find additional corroboration for this explanation in the performance of the 
U.K. stock market.  Recall that abnormal returns for all dividend-paying U.K. stocks 
were essentially zero over the event windows, in line with our assumption of the tax cut 
neutrality outside the U.S.  However, as also shown in Figure 7, zero-dividend (and 
mostly small-cap) U.K. stocks logged positive abnormal returns throughout the entire 
April-June period, similar to what we observed regarding such stocks in the U.S.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the behavior of zero-dividend-paying shares in the U.S 
was the result of a broad (even global) shift in risk tolerances or other fundamentals and 
not of the tax cut per se. 
V.  Further considerations 
In any event study focused on an act of Congress, there will always be some 
uncertainty about the appropriate choice of event window due to the incremental nature 
of informational events.  In the case of the dividend tax cut, while the initial policy 
announcement was a discrete event, some information appeared to leak in December 
hinting toward the new policy proposal.  In addition, our determination of when the 
Congressional debate tilted in favor of a substantive dividend tax cut is somewhat 
subjective, even if quite plausible.
18  One way to provide some evidence on the efficacy 
                                                 
17 We tried testing whether the zero-dividend group also experienced excess bond returns, but only a small 
and non-representative fraction of those firms have bonds outstanding. 
18 We do not put much stock in the more extreme view that the market response dates back to the promise 
of a dividend tax cut during the 2000 election campaign.  In such case, tax cut expectations would have 
seeped into stock prices over the intervening two-and-a-half years making the effect undetectable by any 
event study.  First, there is cross-sectional evidence of the positive tax cut effect for certain classes of 
stocks.  Second, candidate Bush made a number of promises on the campaign trail that did not pan out, and 
it is unclear why the dividend tax cut would have been particularly credible.  Finally, the closeness of the   17
of our event-window choice used in the aggregate analysis is to use the timing of the 
cross-sectional effects as evidence on the reasonableness of the window.   
The first pair of columns in Table 4 shows a ranking of the weekly values for 
abnormal returns on the high-dividend portfolios in the 52 weeks surrounding the tax 
event, starting in November 2002.  Each of the three weeks in our two event windows 
show up among the top five weeks for abnormal returns on the high-dividend portfolio 
(shaded in the table).  Indeed, the top week ends on May 28, which covers the days when 
the bill was passed and signed by the President.  This is the only week in which the 
abnormal return on the high-dividend portfolio (1.58 percent) is significantly different 
from the mean at the five percent level.   
On the other hand, this data also appears to provide evidence of a possible market 
response prior to the leaks in December.  The second highest week (and the only other 
significant observation) is that ending December 11 – the week following the previously-
noted Wall Street Journal article, which revealed administration discussions of a possible 
dividend tax cut.  The third-highest week is also in December.  Nonetheless, even if we 
were to change our test of the aggregate market response to focus on early- or mid-
December, our conclusions regarding the lack of an aggregate effect would not change.  
As was shown in Figure 2, the cumulative abnormal returns on the S&P 500 (relative to 
the Euro 350) over that period were close to zero or even negative. 
An additional pair of interesting observations from this table comes from the 
columns listing abnormal returns on low-dividend and zero-dividend stocks.  The 
abnormal returns on low-dividend stocks during the event weeks (shaded) are near the 
bottom end of the table, consistent with the idea of some portfolio reallocation away from 
low-dividend stocks.  In contrast, zero-dividend stocks recorded high positive CARs (at 
least one standard deviation above sample mean) in ten weeks throughout this period, and 
all but one week has no apparent connection to news about the tax cut.  Even in that week 
(May 28), the return is well below the abnormal return in the highest week (November 
                                                                                                                                                 
eventual vote and the last minute clarification of legislative details indicate that betting on the dividend tax 
cut far in advance would have been a rather brave proposition.   18
27) and not much different from returns in several other weeks.  This finding is consistent 
with our argument that the tax-event-window abnormal returns on zero-dividend stocks 
were probably unrelated to the event itself.   
VI.  Conclusions 
  In summary, we find little if any imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value 
of the aggregate stock market.  U.S. large-cap and small cap indexes did not outperform 
either their European counterparts or REIT stocks during the event windows, regardless 
of how broadly those windows are defined.  The tax cut did appear to have statistically 
significant, cross-sectional effects on stock valuations, with high-dividend firms 
receiving a boost at the expense of low-dividend firms, although this effect seems to have 
been short-lived.  We also find evidence of positive excess returns on zero-dividend 
stocks.  However, further scrutiny of the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of these 
excess returns suggests that they were probably unrelated to the dividend tax cut.  This 
interpretation is supported by our finding that zero-dividend stocks outside the U.S. 
exhibited similarly positive abnormal returns during the tax event windows while foreign 
dividend-paying stocks showed no measurable response. 
  Of course, as with any event study, ours is subject to the usual caveats, the most 
significant being our inability to perfectly control for the myriad other factors that may 
have influenced U.S. stock valuations during or around the event windows.  Regarding 
our aggregate results, there is also the problem of fairly wide confidence intervals that 
comes from having a somewhat diffuse event.  Although we cannot statistically rule out 
the existence of a small valuation effect, we can be reasonably certain that the market was 
not boosted by more than four or five percent.  Moreover, the cross-sectional results 
suggest that portfolio rebalancing from low- to high-dividend stocks may be behind the 
absence of a sizable aggregate response. 
  However, we did not attempt to determine why the tax cut might have had little 
impact.  As suggested earlier, one possibility is that investors discounted the effect on   19
future dividends owing to the built-in sunset provisions, not to mention the uncertainty 
regarding the permanence of any tax regime.  Another mitigating factor is that a 
substantial proportion of U.S. stocks is held in accounts or by entities for which the lower 
dividend tax rate does not apply.   20
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Stock Prices and News on Dividend Tax Cut
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  *Articles concerning dividend tax cut in 15 largest US newspapers.
  **President Bush warns Saddam Hussein of 48-hour deadline for invasion.
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S&P 500 versus S&P Euro 350
     The top panel depicts cumulative realized returns for the S&P 500 index and the S&P Euro 350 index in select months
     surrounding the 2003 dividend tax cut.  The two event windows are represented by shaded areas.  The returns are
     normalized to 100 at the start of each window.  Cumulative abnormal returns, depicted in the bottom panel, are based
     on the contemporaneous regression: S&P 500 returns = a + b (Euro 350 returns), estimated over the second halves
     of 2002 and 2003.
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Russell 2000 versus FTSE Small Cap
     The top panel depicts cumulative realized returns for the Russell 2000 index and the FTSE Small Cap index in select
     months surrounding the 2003 dividend tax cut. The two event windows are represented by shaded areas.  The returns
     are normalized to 100 at the start of each window.  Cumulative abnormal returns, depicted in the bottom panel, are
     based on the contemporaneous regression: Russell 2000 returns = a + b (FTSE Small Cap returns) estimated over the
     second halves of 2002 and 2003
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S&P 500 versus Bloomberg REIT Total Return Index
     The top panel depicts cumulative realized returns for the S&P 500 index and the Bloomberg REIT Total Return index
     in select months surrounding the  2003 dividend tax cut.  The two event windows are represented by shaded areas.
     The returns are normalized to 100 at the start of each window.  Cumulative abnormal returns, depicted in the bottom
     panel, are based on the contemporaneous regression: REIT returns = a + b (S&P 500 returns), estimated over the
     second halves of 2002 and 2003.
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Stock Returns by Dividend Intensity
     The top panel depicts cumulative realized returns for a sample of 2,842 U.S. stocks in select months during 2002
     and 2003. The returns are normalized to 100 at the start of each event window. High-dividend firms are those with
     2002 dividends to end-of-year price ratio ("dividend yield") greater than 3 percent, medium-dividend firms have
     dividend yields between 1 and 3 percent, and low-dividend firms have dividend yields of less than 1 percent.
     Cumulative abnormal returns, depicted in the bottom panel, are based on the contemporaneous regression of
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     Cumulative abnormal returns are based on the contemporaneous regression of portfolio returns on the three Fama-
     French factors, estimated over the second halves of 2002 and 2003.  The estimation interval for each event window
     includes 6 months prior to its start and 6 months following its conclusion. The sample of zero-dividend stocks is
     subdivided further into those of firms with different positive amounts of repurchases and those with no share
     repurchase activity.  The cumulative abnormal returns of firms repurchasing > 2% of market value are depicted by the
     thick solid line, and those of firms repurchasing < 2% of market value with a thin solid line. The returns for each
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United Kingdom Stock Returns by Dividend Intensity
     The top panel depicts cumulative realized returns for a sample of 731 U.K. stocks in select months during 2002 and
     2003. The returns are computed using stock price data from Thomson Financial. The returns are normalized to 100 at
     the start of each event window. High-dividend firms are those with 2002 dividends to end-of-year price ratio ("dividend
     yield") greater than 4 percent, medium-dividend firms have dividend yields between 2 and 4 percent, and low-dividend
     firms have dividend yields of less than 2 percent. These portfolios contain 90, 281 and 254 firms, respectively.
     Cumulative abnormal returns, depicted in the bottom panel, are based on the contemporaneous regression of
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Table 1. - Description of Portfolios               
                        
The table presents a summary of select financial characteristics for a sample of 2,842 U.S. stocks 
subdivided on the basis of their dividend payout choices. High-dividend firms are those with 2002 
dividends to end-of-year price ratio (“dividend yield”) greater than 3 percent, medium-dividend firms have 
dividend yields between 1 and 3 percent, and low-dividend firms have dividend yields of less than 1 
percent.  All firm statistics are year-end 2002 except Cash Flow / Capx, which is the median ratio of 1999, 
2000, and 2002.  Cash includes short-term investments.  The dataset is a merged sample from 
Compustat and CRSP, filtered for public U.S. firms, excluding REITs and open-end funds. 
 
* Cash includes short-term investments.               
All firm statistics from year-end 2002 except Cash Flow / Capx, which is the median ratio of 1999, 2000, and 2002.   
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High-Dividend   256   1351   4.1  11.8  3.5  22.8   161.0   104.2
                         
Med-Dividend    627   1559   1.8  13.7  4.8  14.4   212.2   145.1
                         
Low-Dividend    444   1525   0.6  16.2  5.9  14.2   209.0   117.2
                         
Zero-Dividend   1515   369   0.0  23.5  13.8  8.0   161.0   63.1
                                              
                         Table 2. - Tests of Significance          
              
The table presents statistical tests of differences in realized cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) over the two event windows across various categorizations of U.S. stocks.  Cumulative 
abnormal returns are based on the contemporaneous regression of equity returns on the 
three Fama-French factors, estimated over the second halves of 2002 and 2003.  The top two 
panels are CARs for portfolios of equities with different levels of dividend yields.  High-
dividend firms are those with dividend yields greater than 3 percent, medium-dividend firms 
have dividend yields between 1 and 3 percent, and low-dividend firms have dividend yields of 
less than 1 percent.  The bottom panel restricts the sample to firms with publicly traded 
bonds.  In this sample, cumulative abnormal equity returns for high-dividend firms over the 
May 2003 event window are compared with those for low-dividend firms.  The same 
comparison is made for cumulative abnormal bond returns, which are based on the 
regression of bond returns on the change in yield in Treasury notes of comparable maturity 
and change in spread for a corporate bond index of comparable rating.  In all panels shaded 
areas denote statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better. 
              
A. Tests of Significance - January      
 
Portfolio  
C.A.R.         
Jan 2 - 9       
(percent)  
S.E. Residuals 
from Regression  
P - diff than 
zero 
P - diff than 
low div. 
            
High-Dividend   1.23   0.0024    0.0192  0.0183 
            
Med-Dividend   -0.15   0.0021    0.3880 0.3418 
            
Low-Dividend   -0.45   0.0022    0.2026   
            
Zero-Dividend   0.30   0.0029    0.3375  0.2007 
 
B. Tests of Significance - May           
 
Portfolio  
C.A.R.         
May 13 - 28     
(percent)  
S.E. Residuals 
from Regression  
P - diff than 
zero 
P - diff than 
low div. 
            
High-Dividend   2.70   0.0024    0.0004  0.0002 
            
Med-Dividend   -0.52   0.0021    0.2268 0.2883 
            
Low-Dividend   -1.09   0.0022    0.0691   
            








 Table 2. - Tests of Significance (continued)       
 















































    C.A.R. May 13 - 28 (percent)       
            
Return Type   
High           
Dividend Firms   
Low        
Dividend Firms  
P - abnormal returns high 
div. diff than low div.* 
            
Equity 
Returns   4.98  2.02      0.0060 
            
Bond 
Returns   -0.05  -0.22      0.4897 
  * From a regression of abnormal returns on a constant and a dummy variable for dividend portfolio type. Table 3. - Equity Issuance Proportions for June 2003 to August 2005    
              
The table summarizes equity issuance by dividend-paying firms and zero-dividend firms during the period 
from June 2003 through August 2005.  Zero-dividend firms are further subdivided into those with major 
and minor share repurchases, and those that did not buy back shares over this period.  We define issuers 
as firms that issued shares numbering two percent or more of their shares outstanding at year-end 2002 
over the period described above.  The second row in the table shows the fraction of firms issuing 
equities, and the third row quantifies the extent of issuance, defined as the number of newly issued 
shares relative to shares outstanding at the end of 2002.  Equity issuance data are obtained from SDC. 
                       
 









> 2%     
      
Number of Firms    916 415 234    1380
      
Percent Issuing Equity                             
(June 2003 to August 2005)   14% 12% 7%*    12%
             
Newly Issued Shares as Percent of 
2002 Shares (median among issuers)    21%  19%  22%   13%


























*The fraction of major-repurchasing zero-dividend firms issuing equities is statistically different from that for minor repurchasing 
zero-dividend firms at the 10 percent level, and different from that for non-repurchasing firms at the 1 percent level. Table 4. – Weekly Excess Returns by Dividend Portfolio    
              
The table summarizes cumulative abnormal returns in each week during the year-long period starting in November, 2002.  The 
CARs are computed on the basis of the three-factor Fama-French model for each of the following dividend-yield portfolios: those of 
high-dividend firms (dividend yield greater than 3 percent), low-dividend firms (dividend yield less than 3 percent), and zero-
dividend firms. Weeks that are defined as tax-event windows in the paper are shaded. The statistical significance of the difference 
between a given week's CAR and portfolio-specific sample mean is denoted by * and ** for 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
                         
 
Rank   High  Dividend   Low  Dividend   Zero  Dividend  
   Date Return    Date Return    Date Return   
                  
1   28-May-03  1.58 ** 4-Jun-03 0.85 27-Nov-02  1.31** 
2    11-Dec-02 0.96  *  1-Oct-03 0.85  20-Nov-02 1.02** 
3    24-Dec-02 0.79    29-Oct-03 0.85  23-Apr-03 0.94* 
4   8-Jan-03  0.71   18-Dec-02 0.82  28-May-03  0.76 
5   21-May-03  0.70   4-Dec-02 0.80 9-Jul-03  0.73 
6    18-Dec-02 0.67    5-Feb-03 0.74  14-May-03 0.71 
7    30-Jul-03 0.63    13-Aug-03 0.72  31-Dec-02 0.69 
8    23-Jul-03 0.61    24-Dec-02 0.71  26-Mar-03 0.67 
9    22-Jan-03 0.52    19-Mar-03 0.71  30-Apr-03 0.64 
10    29-Oct-03 0.48    7-May-03 0.69  19-Mar-03 0.63 
11    14-May-03 0.42    16-Apr-03 0.66  18-Jun-03 0.54 
12    30-Apr-03 0.42    11-Jun-03 0.59  13-Nov-02 0.44 
13    2-Jul-03 0.34    6-Aug-03 0.53  18-Dec-02 0.44 
14    1-Oct-03 0.34    23-Jul-03 0.50  2-Jul-03 0.42 
15    16-Jul-03 0.27    30-Jul-03 0.48  7-May-03 0.41 
16    26-Mar-03 0.21    11-Dec-02 0.44  22-Oct-03 0.39 
17    5-Feb-03 0.18    16-Jul-03 0.43  29-Oct-03 0.38 
18    20-Nov-02 0.17    24-Sep-03 0.41  11-Jun-03 0.38 
19    4-Dec-02 0.15    23-Apr-03 0.39  4-Dec-02 0.37 
20    31-Dec-02 0.14    25-Jun-03 0.31  6-Aug-03 0.35 
21    5-Mar-03 0.13    13-Nov-02 0.30  24-Dec-02 0.34 
22   27-Nov-02  0.12   26-Feb-03 0.27  21-May-03  0.28 
23    10-Sep-03 0.12    2-Apr-03 0.25  4-Jun-03 0.27 
24    26-Feb-03 0.09    5-Nov-03 0.23  27-Aug-03 0.26 
25    23-Apr-03 0.08    9-Jul-03 0.23  25-Jun-03 0.25 
26    19-Feb-03 0.05    14-May-03 0.22  23-Jul-03 0.23 
27    16-Apr-03 0.05    31-Dec-02 0.20  11-Dec-02 0.21 
28   13-Nov-02  0.03   22-Oct-03 0.19  8-Jan-03  0.20 
29   11-Jun-03  -0.01   26-Mar-03 0.18  22-Jan-03  0.15 
30   7-May-03  -0.01   9-Apr-03 0.17  20-Aug-03  0.14 
31   2-Apr-03  -0.04   2-Jul-03 0.17  16-Jul-03  0.12 
32   4-Jun-03  -0.05   30-Apr-03 0.14  3-Sep-03  0.11 
33   22-Oct-03  -0.07   15-Oct-03 0.09  10-Sep-03  0.08 
34   17-Sep-03  -0.09   22-Jan-03 0.07  13-Aug-03  0.06 
35   9-Apr-03  -0.10   8-Oct-03 0.07  24-Sep-03  0.05 
36    24-Sep-03 -0.11    29-Jan-03 0.05  26-Feb-03 -0.04 
37    20-Aug-03 -0.13    20-Aug-03 0.05  5-Nov-03 -0.04 
38    13-Aug-03 -0.20    15-Jan-03 0.03  8-Oct-03 -0.05 
39    18-Jun-03 -0.28    17-Sep-03 -0.03  15-Jan-03 -0.07 
40    27-Aug-03 -0.29    18-Jun-03 -0.04  16-Apr-03 -0.11 
41    19-Mar-03 -0.30    20-Nov-02 -0.09  19-Feb-03 -0.13 
42    5-Nov-03 -0.37    12-Feb-03 -0.11  9-Apr-03 -0.13 
43    29-Jan-03 -0.39    3-Sep-03 -0.13  30-Jul-03 -0.13 
44   12-Feb-03  -0.43   28-May-03 -0.17  15-Oct-03 -0.18 
45   25-Jun-03  -0.43   8-Jan-03 -0.20  2-Apr-03 -0.21 
46    8-Oct-03 -0.50    19-Feb-03 -0.33  12-Mar-03 -0.25 
47    3-Sep-03 -0.50    12-Mar-03 -0.40  17-Sep-03 -0.29 
48    12-Mar-03 -0.53    5-Mar-03 -0.40  29-Jan-03 -0.31 
49    15-Jan-03 -0.55    10-Sep-03 -0.40  1-Oct-03 -0.52* 
50   9-Jul-03  -0.62   21-May-03 -0.42*  5-Mar-03 -0.52* 
51    15-Oct-03 -0.67    27-Aug-03 -0.45*  12-Feb-03 -0.59* 
52    6-Aug-03 -0.77  *  27-Nov-02 -0.51*  5-Feb-03 -0.65** 1 
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